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ABSTRACT 
The severity of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 had induced Thailand, South Korea, and 
Indonesia to request aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Malaysia, however, 
announced capital control measures by imposing broad controls on capital-account transactions, 
furing the exchange rate at RM3.80 per US$, cutting interest rates, and embarking on a poliq of 
disinflation 
This paper tries to resolve this particular research oroblem: which of these two corrective measures 
was more successfirl in calming down thefinancial woes? Although there were efforts to compare the 
effectiveness of the Malaysian capital control against the IMF measures in the immediate term, no 
attempt has been made to look into the intermediate effects. Therefore, the obiective of this paper is 
to compare the effectiveness of the Malaysian capital control vis-ri-vis IMF-supported programs (in 
South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia) in terms of intermediate macroeconomic conditions. 
This research ertenk the immediate period defined by Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) and measures the 
'1 financial market pressure i n d q  (FMPI) and several macroeconomic variables in order to compare " the effectiveness of the Malaysian capital control versus the IMF program in the other three 
countries. 
The results show that compared to the IMF measures, the Malaysian capital control is more effective 
in controlling the consumer price index, leveling the imports, and curbing excessive employment. 
Keywork: Asian Financial Crisis, Capital Control, IMF, Malaysia. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Numerous efforts have been made to analyse the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 that inflicted 
economic chaos to several countries in the region. Abundant of them focused on the roots or causes 
of the crisis. Generally, several researchers agreed that the opening up to short-term international 
capital flows resulted in financial vulnerabilities and macroeconomic weaknesses that allowed a crisis 
to occur (Bhagwati 1998; Krugman 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; Rodrik 1998; Stiglitz 1998a, 1998b). ~h~ 
scenario of high export growth and foreign exchange earning capacity in 1980s mismatch with the 
high current account deficits, declining export growth and higher debt dependence situation during 
1996 and 1997. This disparity, coupled with the ballooning of speculative bubbles, growing 
dependence on short-term debt, and growing non-performing loans in the financial sectors, made a 
sudden loss of confidence so harmful to the financial system (Lim 1999). 
The effects of the crisis were so severe that Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia had to request aid 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These countries embarked on IMF-supported and IMF- 
designed programs, with cooperation from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank and pledges 
of standby credit from the Exchange Stabilization Fund of the United States. As a result of receiving 
these aids, these countries committed to float their exchange rates, raise interest rates, tighten fiscal 
policy, open up their financial markets to foreigners, close troubled banks and financial institutions, 
and undertake a range of other structural reforms (Nanto 1998; Kaplan and Rodrik 2001). 
Nevertheless, attaining IMF aid is not the only choice to capital account liberalisation, as with the 
case for Malaysia, which announced capital control measures on September 1, 1998. Instead of going 
to the IMF, Malaysia imposed broad controls on capital-account transactions, fixed the exchange rate 
at RM3.80 per US$, cut interest rates, and embarked on a policy of disinflation (Dornbusch 2001, 
Kaplan and Rodrik 2001). Malaysia's experience proved that capital control might be a better 
alternative to the destabilising effects of capital flows on inadequately regulated financial systems 
(Jomo 200 I ). 
In fact, several distinguished economists and finance researchers have criticised the IMF programs as 
being excessively harsh and, in consequence, helped to intensify the crisis further (Feldstein 1998; 
Krugman 1998a; Krugman 1998b; Krugman 1998c; Sachs and Radlett 1998; Stiglitz 1998a; Stiglitz 
1998b). They argued that the shock treatment that the IMF gave to Thailand, South Korea and 
Indonesia - immediate closure of failing institutions and banks, immediate austerity measures (fiscal 
tightness and high interest rates) - seems to have created more loss of confidence, caused more capital 
outflows at a crucial time, and caused the regional crisis to be deeper. 
The fact of the matter is that two types of corrective measures were taken to fix the predicament that 
shed the glittering light of miraculous success of the inflicted countries. This paper tries to resolve 
this particular research vroblem: which of these two corrective measures was more successful in 
calming down thejinancial woes? 
Section 2 will discuss the justification of this study by explaining the justification for implementing 
capital control in Malaysia and the objective of this study. Section 3 will discuss several empirical 
evaluations on the Malaysian capital control measures, focusing on the methodology and results of 
Kaplan and Rodrik (2001). Section 4 will touch on the research issue. Section 5 will explain the 
research design and methodology. Finally, section 6 will discuss and analyse the results, and section 
7 will conclude this research paper. 
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11. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
The previous section provides some background on the Asian financial crisis and describes the IMF- 
sponsored programs taken by Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia. This section will highlight the 
basis and justification of the Malaysian capital control, and later provide the objective of the study 
Implementing the Malaysian capital control. Capital and exchange controls have been implemented 
since time immemorial (Bond 1999). Examples of capital control measures are controls on foreign and 
local expatriation of investment income, controls on domestic ownership of foreign assets and vice versa, 
controls on currency convertibility, and restrictions on financial flows related to local branches of foreign 
banks. Basically many countries have used capital controls, and even since the 138Os, several studies have 
shown that these controls effectively prevented capital flight during financial crises by dampening local 
financial volatility and allowing interest rates to be kept at relatively lower levels (Bond 1998). For 
example, responding to excessive financial inflows during the 1960s, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland imposed limits on non-residents' purchase of local debt securities and on their bank deposits 
(Bond 1998). 
In the case of Malaysia, capital controls were implemented in order to prevent a loss of 
macroeconomic control (Bond 1998) and also to gain monetary policy independence (Cook and 
Devereux 2001). In this respect, the government would be able to defend a fixed exchange rate while 
at the same time giving some effectiveness to domestic monetary policy. The major measures 
pr implemented on September 1, 1998 were (i) non-residents should hold their principal sum for 
portfolio investment for at least 12 months in Malaysia (ii) prior approval for transfer of funds 
between external accounts (iii) all payments for imports and exports proceeds must be made in foreign 
currency (iv) prior approval for overseas investment in excess of RM10,OOO and (v) exchange rate 
was fixed (Dornbusch 200 1). 
This paper has explained the background and justification of implementing the Malaysian capital 
control. Now, the paper will discuss on the justification of this study by providing the direction and 
objective of the research. 
The effectiveness of the MaIaysian capital control. The previous sections have described the many 
intricacies involved with regards to implementing the IMF measures and the capital control. 
Researchers are still studying the causes and implications of the Asian financial crisis, but there is 
lack of effort that is directed into comparing the effectiveness of the Malaysian capital control against 
the IMF measures. Although Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) performed a rigorous study into that, their 
research focused on the immediate (which is during the one year after going to IMF or implementing 
capital control) comparisons. No detailed comparison has been done beyond that one-year period. 
Therefore, there is a gap in the literature because no attempt has been made to look into the 
'\ intermediate effects of the Malaysian capital control and the IMF measures. Therefore, the obiective 
of this paper is to assess the effectiveness ofthe Malaysian capital control vis-ri-vis IMF-supported 
programs (in South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia) in terms of intermediate (instead of immediate) 
macroeconomic conditions. 
III. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION ON THE MALAYSIAN CAPITAL CONTROL 
Several researchers have argued that there is no clear empirical evidence that the Malaysian capital 
control measures have contributed decisively to its economic recovery (Jomo 200 1; Lim 1999). They 
reasoned that, while the other crisis-affected countries turned around in the first quarter of 1999, 
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Malaysia was the only one to do so in the second quarter of 1999, and several other countries 
registered even higher growth rates. 
On the other hand, several scholars have empirically proven that the Malaysian capital control policy 
was more successhl than the IMF-sponsored recovery programs (Bond 1999; Kaplan and Rodrik 
2001). Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) utilized the time-shifted difference-in-differences estimates to 
prove their assenion. The method they used appropriately treats the timing of the before-after 
comparisons as country-specific. It took into consideration the date that each country called in the 
IMF or, as in Malaysia's case, imposed capital controls. Table 1 lists the dates that are involved in the 
construction of the treatment windows for each of the four countries of interest. 
Table 1: Timing of the treatment windows 
Country 
Thailand 
I I I 
South Korea 1 November 2 1,1997 1 December 4, 1997 12/97 - 1 1/98 1 
Indonesia 
Date of first official 
announcement that 
country will seek IMF 
assistance 
July 28, 1997 
I I I I 1 
Source: Based on Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) 
October 8,1997 
Malaysia 
The empirical work of Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) centred on the question of whether Malaysia would 
have been better off in the immediate aftermath of the crisis following the IMF-prescribed route that 
the other countries followed. Using the relevant data for those four countries (Malaysia, South Korea, 
Thailand and Indonesia), the researchers performed regression, covering the period 1992 through 
1996 ("before") and the one-year of treatment ("after"). The one-year of treatment is the one-year 
period following the seeking of IMF assistance (for South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia) or the 
imposition of capital controls (for Malaysia). 
Date of IMF Executive 
Board approval of 
program 
August 20, 1997 
To measure currency and interest rate stability, Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) used the financial market 
pressure index (FMPI) that combines the rates of changes in exchange rate, foreign currency reserves, 
and the interest rates. They also used several other variables as indicators of market confidence and a 
more balanced and expansionary fiscal policy. Among the variables used were stock market index, 
inflation rate, real impons, real exports, real GDP growth, and unemployment rate. 
Treatment windows 
8/97 - 7/98 
November 5, 1997 
n.a. 
Then, a time-shifted difference-in-differences specification of the following form was created (Kaplan 
and Rodrik, 2001): 
10197 - 9/98 
Y,,=Ciatdi+ pdwi +ydMdhi+~it 
Where: 
kit = a measure of economic performance of interest, where t stands for time and i stands for 
one of the four countries 
di = a country-specific dummy variable (dM = 1 when i = Malaysia and otherwise, and so on); 
n.a. 
MFA'S sM ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM, 23RD-24TH APRIL 2003 
9/98 - 8/99 
d, = a country-specific time-varying variable that takes the value of 1 during the 12 months 
that follow T = September 1, 1998 (i.e., during the one-year period subsequent to the 
imposition of capital controls in Malaysia), and is 0 otherwise; and ui, is the error term. 
The method captured the effect of undergoing IMF treatment during an economic crisis (relative to 
outcomes in more normal times), and also the differential effect of capital controls in Malaysia 
(compared to an IMF program). In conclusion, the Malaysian capital control policy was more 
successful in accomplishing an immediate reduction in interest rates, stabilizing the currency, and 
stemming financial panic (Kaplan and Rodrik 2001). 
This section has described in detail the literature relevant to the study. The next section will explain 
how the literature is utilized in developing the research framework for this study. 
IV. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As elaborated in the previous section, Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) measured the financial market 
pressure index and macroeconomic indicators during the one-year treatment window to compare the 
immediate effects of the Malaysian capital control against that of the IMF measures. If we were to 
extend Kaplan and Rodrik's research by adding relevant data sets for 1999, 2000 and 2001, two 
imperative questions arise and these are the research questions in this study: 
1) Would the financial market pressure index (FMPI) show a recovery sign for all the 
four countries, and if so, would Malaysia still erhibit the most favourable position 
I 
(Low FMPI)? 
2) Would there be a significant improvement in the overall economy, and if so, would 
Malaysia record a significant difference compared to the other three countries? 
Based cn the research questions above, this research will investigate up to three years beyond the 
treatment window used by Kaplan and Rodrik - 1999,2000 and 200 1. This is in order to gain insight 
into the intermediate effects of the capital control v i s - h i s  IMF measures. The detailed discussion on 
research design and methodological issues will be provided in the next section. 
V. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The previous section has outlined the research questions pertaining to this study. This section will 
discuss the research design and methodological issues that are appropriate in order to resolve the 
research questions. Several issues with regards to the research design need to be addressed and they 
are the windows of study, the financial market pressure index (FMPI), measures of macroeconomic 
variables and paired samples test of difference in means. 
.\ Defining the relevant windows of study 
.V Starting from after the treatme'nt window, the relevant and available data are gathered in order to 
extend Kaplan and Rodrik's research, which only focused on the immediate effect of the IMF and 
capital control measures. The interest of this research is to measure the FMPI and several relevant 
economic variables in the three years following the treatment window defined by Kaplan and Rodrik 
(2001), which are 1999, 2000 and 2001. It is assumed that the duration of two to three years can 
reasonably capture the intermediate macroeconomic effects that we are interested in. Table 2 
summarises the relevant windows pertaining to each ofthe four countries in this research. 
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I I I 
Indonesia 
I I I 
I I I I 
Source developed based on Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) I 
1 I-year after 
8/98-7199 
South Korea 
I I I 
The 'one-year after' window for Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea is 1999. For Malaysia, the 
'one-year after' window is the year 2000. The 'two-year after' window for Thailand, Indonesia, and 





The calculation of financial market pressure index (FMPI) 
Consistent with Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) and also Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995), we 
calculated the financial market pressure index (FMPI) as the average of the changes in the (log) 
exchange rate, changes in (log) foreign currency reserves (with declines in reserves contributing 
positively to the index), and changes in the interest rate. The notion is that financial market pressure 
must be reflected in a decline in the value of the home currency, a decline in reserves, or an increase 
in interest rates. 
1 12197-1 1/98 
Measures of macroeconomic variables 
The macroeconomic variables selected for this research are divided into two categories: 'positive' 
macroeconomic variables (GDP, balance of payments, export and industrial production index) and 
also 'negative' macroeconomic variables (Consumer Price Index, Import and Unemployment rate). 
The percentage changes in: (log) GDP, (log) balance of payments, (log) Export, (log) Industrial 
Production Index, (log) Consumer Price Index, (log) Import and unemployment rate are calculated. 
Then, the means of the changes are computed and are divided into two categories mentioned above. 
All the variables above were also used by Kaplan and Rodrik (2001), but a few other variables are 
omitted in this research due to high volatility (stock market index) and unavailability of data (real 
wages, financial inflows, real investment and real government consumption). 
10/98-9/99 
9/98-8199 
Paired Samples Test of Difference in Means 
The sophisticated time-shifted difference-in-differences specification employed by Kaplan and Rodrik 
(2001) is not used in this research because Kaplan and Rodrik's main concern was to compare the 
effectiveness of capital control versus the IMF program during the one-year period after their 
implementation, using monthly data. Therefore, a time-shifted specification is thus necessary in that 
research in order to define the period up to the weeks and months of the year. 
10199-9100 
12198-1 1199 
With annual data in hand, the aim of this research is to test the difference in the FMPI and several 
macroeconomic variables between Malaysia and the other three countries (Thailand, South Korea and 
Indonesia), during the one-year period and two-year period after the treatment window (1 999, 2000 
and 2001). This research employs the paired samples test of difference in means (Zikmund 2000) 
using the SPSS 10.0 to test if there is any significant difference between Malaysia and the other three 
afflicted countries in terms of financial market pressure index and the selected macroeconomic 
indicators. The study also analyses the correlations between Malaysia and the other countries with 
12199- 1 1/00 
9199-8/00 
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9100-810 1 
respect to the financial market pressure index and macroeconomic variables t'o identify any significant 
positive or negative correlation. 
In conclusion, this study extends the treatment window defined by Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) and 
measures the FMPI and several macroeconomic variables in order to compare the effectiveness of the 
Malaysian capital control versus the IMF program of the other three amicted countries. Next, this 
paper will discuss the results and analysis of data. 
VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 
This section will discuss in depth the results and analysis of data one-year after the treatment window 
and two-years after the treatment window. Table 3 summarises Malaysia's position for each variable 
calculated, in each window with respect to South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, while table 4 
provides the overall results on the paired samples means test. 
Table 3: Summary of Malaysia's position compared to South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia 





(Source developed for this model) 
Legends: 
FMPI : Financial market pressure index 
+Macro: Positive macroeconomic indicators (GDP, Balance of payments, Export, 
Industrial production index) 
-Macro : Negative macroeconomic indicators (Consumer price index, import, 
unemployment rate) 
FAV: Favourable to Malaysia 
UNF: Unfavourable to Malaysia 
Period after treatment window 

























Table 4: Summary of Overall Results 
* ,  
Legends: 
FMPI : Financial market pressure index 
+Macro: Positive macroeco~omic 
-Macro : Negative macroeconomic indicators 
* Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1 % level 
1.One-year after the treatment window 
Financial market pressure index (FMPI). Based on table 3, Malaysia's FMPI is unfavourable 
compared to South Korea and Thailand, but favourable with respect to Indonesia. However, looking 
at the detailed results in table 4, these differences are not statistically significant at 0.05 level. Then, 
paired samples correlations test reveals that there is a strong negative correlation between Malaysia 
and South Korea and between Malaysia and Thailand in terms of FMPI. Malaysia and Indonesia has 
a strong positive correlation of FMPI during that period. All three correlations are statistically 
significant at 5%, and Malaysia-Indonesia's correlation is significant at 1%. 
Positive Macroeconomic Variables. Malaysian positive macroeconomic conditions during the 1- 
year after the treatment window are unfavourable compared to South Korea, but more favourable than 
Thailand and Indonesia. Nevertheless, the differences are not significant, as shown in table 4. 
Negative Macroeconomic Variables. Malaysian negative macroeconomic variables are better off 
than South Korea and Indonesia, but worse off than Thailand. This is due to substantial growth in 
Malaysian imports (RM3 11 million in 2000 versus RM248 in 1999 or 25% increase), compared to 
Thailand (Baht 190 million in 1999 versus Baht 177 million in 1998 or only 7% increase). However, 
these differences are not statistically significant. 
MFA'S sM ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM, 23RD-24M APRIL 2003 
864 
$ 8  
- F  ~-< .
2. Two years after the 'treatment' window 
Financial market pressure index (FMPI). Malaysia is worse than South Korea, but more 
favourable than Indonesia and Thailand in terms of the financial market pressure. Nevertheless, the 
differences are not statistically significant. However, there is a strong positive correlations between 
Malaysia and Thailand and between Malaysia and Indonesia (r = +1.000) in terms of the FMPI. 
These correlations are statistically significant at 5% (Malaysia versus Indonesia) and at 1% (Malaysia 
versus Thailand). 
Positive Macroeconomic Variables. The positive macroeconomic variables for Malaysia two years 
after the treatment window are unfavourable to that of the other three countries. Furthermore, the 
difference with South Korea is statistically significant (0.049), and the difference with Indonesia is 
close to significance (0.07). This could be explained by the slow GDP growth of 0.4% for Malaysia 
in the year 2001. Besides, Malaysian exports and reserves recorded a decline in 2001, contrary to 
what the other three countries recorded during 2000. 
Negative Macroeconomic Variables. Malaysia is better off than all the other three countries in 
terms of CPI, unemployment and imports. Malaysia recorded lower inflation rate (3-4%), 
unemployment rate stood at 3.6% and declining imports (-9%). Nevertheless, the differences are not 
statistically significant. 
In conclusion, Malaysia is not significantly more favourable than the other three countries in terms of 
financial market pressure index, positive macroeconomic indicators, and negative macroeconomic 
indicators. This would lead to a conclusion that capital control does not provide a significantly better 
corrective measures compared to that of the IMF. Nevertheless, the negative macroeconomic 
indicators show that Malaysia is more favourable than all the other three countries, implying that 
capital control might have functioned more effectively in controlling the CPI, levelling the imports, 
and curbing excessive employment compared to IMF measures. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There are two main dificulties in assessing the macroeconomic effects of the Malaysian capital 
control with respect to the IMF measures in South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia. Firstly, the timing 
of both corrective measures was different. Secondly, the objectives are somewhat dissimilar, because 
capital control is explicitly not targeted to the long-term investors but rather to the 3-month maturity 
speculators (Dornbusch 2001). Therefore, it is hard to find a substantial impact of  capital controls 
unless they had a devastatingly negative effect. 
Based on the results, two notable 'conclusions can be inferred. Firstly, it can be inferred that the 
r relationship between Malaysia and the other three countries were not consistent among the three types 
of indicators used (FMPI, positive and negative macroeconomic variables) and also between the two 
windows used for this study. Malaysian interest rate and international reserves did not improve 
drastically immediately after the capital control, compared South Korea and Thailand. Nevertheless, 
a year later, the situation was reversed between Malaysia and South Korea, while the relationships 
between the other two countries did not change. During one-year after the treatment window, 
Malaysia's FMPI was unfavourable to that of Thailand, while the positive macroeconomic indicators 
were favourable compared to Thailand. Nevertheless, the negative macroeconomic indicators 
favoured Thailand instead of Malaysia. Only with Indonesia that Malaysia was favourable in all three 
aspects during that one-year period after the treatment window. 
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Secondly, the positive macroeconomic indicators were unfavourable to Malaysia, while the negative 
macroeconomic variables were favourable to Malaysia, with respect to the three countries in the two- 
years after period. The difference between Malaysia and South Korea was statistically significant 
(0.049), showing that South Korea had significantly improved its positive macroeconomic condition 
two years after the corrective measure compared to Malaysia. Nevertheless, the negative 
macroeconomic indicators were favourable to Malaysia, although not significant. If this enigma 
entails, which of the two macroeconomic indicators (positive or negative) can better measure 
improvement in the economy as a whole? Therefore, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness ofthe 
Malaysian capital control in the intermediate term vis-8-vis IMF measure in Thailand, South Korea, 
and Indonesia. Furthermore, there could be other factors that might also have affected the economy 
of these countries, in addition to the capital control or IMF measures. With that respect, fUrther 
research into this area is suggested with additional variables (besides financial market pressure and 
macroeconomic variables) and also extended time frame (4-5 years after the crisis) in order to benet 
explain the intermediate effects. 
Overall, it can be cautiously concluded that, after two years of implementing capital control, Malaysia 
lagged behind South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia in terms of GDP growth, balance of payments, 
exports, and industrial production. Malaysia also lagged behind in terms of interest rate and 
international reserves during that period (except with South Korea). However, Malaysia was better 
off than the other three countries in terms of consumer price index, imports, and unemployment rate. 
This suggests that the Malaysian capital control might have functioned more effectively in controlling 
inflation, levelling the imports and curbing excessive employment compared to IMF measures. 
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